MEMORANDUM DECISION  3  course after filing the petition – the deadlines for doing so vary depending on the chapter.5  Recognizing that a strict application of these requirements could prevent  relief for individuals who are unable to comply for reasons beyond their control, Congress provided certain exceptions. The Bankruptcy Code provisions setting forth exceptions to the required postpetition financial management course simply refer to a subset of the statute’s broader exceptions to the required prepetition credit counseling course.6 Under this provision, a debtor need not complete the required course if “the court determines [that the debtor] is unable to complete those requirements because of incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone.”7 The statute puts further meat on the bones of two of these criteria – “incapacity” is defined to mean “that the debtor is impaired by reason of mental illness or mental deficiency so that he is incapable of realizing and making rational decisions with respect to his financial responsibilities” and “disability” is defined to mean “that the debtor is so physically impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort, to participate in an in person, telephone, or Internet briefing.”8  As other courts applying this language have observed, Congress used clear,  unambiguous language in delineating the exceptions.9 And, of course, long established canons of statutory interpretation require courts to apply statutes as written when possible.10  Applying the exceptions to Mr. Schultz’s request, there is no evidence or  allegation that he is currently engaged in military service,11 that he suffers from    5 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(11), 1328(g)(1); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1007(b)(7), (c); 4004(c)(1)(H).  6 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)(11), 1328(g)(2). The provisions also set forth another exception when the U.S. trustee  deems the courses in the district inadequate. This exception is not applicable here.  7 Id. § 109(h)(4).  8 Id.  9 See, e.g., In re Alexander, 432 B.R. 41, 44 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010); In re Goodwin, 2009 WL 6499330, at *1  (Bankr. N.D. Ga. March 12, 2009).  10 When construing statutes, courts apply a “cardinal canon before all others” and “must presume that a legislature  says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous . . ., this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.” Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (cleaned up). See also, e.g., Sloan v. Lewis, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 150, 155 (1875) (explaining, in the process of resolving a dispute about the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, that “we must look in the first place to the act itself” and “[i]f the intention of Congress is manifest from what there appears we need not go further”).  11 It is unlikely that Mr. Schultz is engaged in military service as his schedules fail to so indicate. See Sch. I, ECF  No. 1; Am. Sch. I, ECF No. 107. It is almost certain that Mr. Schultz is not currently in a combat zone by virtue of his incarceration.  18-01804-WLH7 Doc 116 Filed 03/30/21 Entered 03/30/21 09:42:03 Pg 3 of 8

Document 116