4    is available. Those courts have based that policy rationale on the technical requirement that the  discharge must be for a “person,” and an estate is not a person under the Code.  4  Conversely, several cases have proposed that a sole debtor may have the financial course  requirement waived due to the debtor’s death. Two cases from within this Circuit and one from  Arkansas in the 8  th Circuit are persuasive to this Court. 5 In each of these cases, the debtor’s  representative/ co-debtor failed to file a motion to continue the payments under the plan at the time  of death. Instead, each question was raised, as it is in this case, after the plan had been paid off and  the debtor had been deceased for some time. This makes sense given that the code is silent as to  what steps should be taken and what time and what kind of motions are proper. For this reason,  the Court notes that it would usually be prudent and proper practice to file such motion at the time  of death rather than use a wait and see approach. Also like the case before the Court, despite lack  of notice to creditors at the time of death, two of those cases were paired with requests for discharge  in which the death of the debtor was noticed out to creditors in that request.  When reversing the Bankruptcy Court, which dismissed the mattersua sponteonce it  became aware of the debtor’s death, the District Court inFogel6 held that the rule does not  mandate dismissal upon the death of a sole debtor, and that the non-debtor spouse may continue  to make plan payments. The District Court stated that the Bankruptcy Court’s general observation  was error. The Bankruptcy Court found that a Chapter 13 is usually based on debtors’ future  incomes and that therefore the death would preclude plan payments. Instead, the Bankruptcy Court    4In re Shepherd, 490 B.R. 338 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2013).But seeLundin & Brown, Chapter 13 Bankruptcy, § 7.8, at ¶ 1, (Although a decedent's estate is not eligible to be a debtor, the personal representative of that estate is not barred from filing in their individual capacity) (citingBunch v. Hopkins Sav. Bank, 249 B.R. 667, 668 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000)). 5In re Fogel,550 B.R. 532 (D. Colo. 2015);In Re Inyard, 532 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2015);In Re Shorter,544 B.R. 654 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2015). 6 550 B.R. 532 (D. Colo. 2015).  Case 15-31667 Doc 41 Filed 10/30/20 Entered 10/30/20 07:38:44 Desc Main  Document Page 4 of 7

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