Court has jurisdiction in this matter,Id. In any event, even if the matter is deemed non-core, the  Parties appear to have nonetheless consented to the entry of a final judgment by this Court as  authorized by11 U.S.C. §157(c)(2).Id.The Court therefore finds that it has the jurisdiction to enter  a final judgment in this matter.  3  BACKGROUND  The Parties were married on July 14, 1994, in Virginia.  4 They lived together  3  Both Parties consented to the entry of final judgment by this Court inWagner v. Wagner,  Adv. No. 19-1001-TPA (Complaint and Answer at ¶5, Doc. Nos. 1, 9). In addition, Husband consented in hisMotion to Dismissfiled in his bankruptcy case on December 4, 2019 at Doc. No. 176 (see prayer for relief) and in the colloquy between the Court and Husband’s attorney that took place at the hearing on theMotion to Dismiss(See Audio Transcript of Proceedings dated Jan. 8, 2020 at 11:24:22 through 11:24:46). If it is ultimately determined that this is a non-core matter, and that the Parties did not effectively consent to this Court entering a final judgment, then the Court intends this Opinion to be proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law for the consideration of the District Court pursuant to11 U.S.C. §157(c)(1).  4    Audio Transcript of Trialof April 24, 2019, 10:39:20 to 10:39:29; 11:00:11 to 11:00:44  (hereinafter “Tr. Audio at ___”). Husband questioned the validity of the 1994 date for the inception of the marriage because in 1997 the Parties traveled to Wife’s home country of the Philippines for a visit, during which time Husband contends the 1994 marriage was “annulled” and the Parties were remarried in a ceremony in that country. Wife acknowledges this 1997 trip and the marriage ceremony which occurred, but stated that it was done solely for the benefit of her family and denied knowledge of any annulment of the 1994 marriage. Husband argued that this sequence of events invalidated the 1994 marriage and calls into question the ability of a court in this country to order an allocation of the marital property. The Court rejects that argument. No documentary evidence or law was provided to support either the existence or the effect of the purported annulment and subsequent remarriage. Further, the Court notes that it is likely that Husband is judicially estopped from even making such argument since prior to the filing of Wife’s bankruptcy case he initiated a divorce action in state court including a claim for equitable distribution, as is noted subsequently above. Finally, even if the Virginia marriage in state court in 1994 was somehow rendered a nullity by events occurring in the Philippines 3 years later, it is undisputed that the Parties were “remarried” at that time and that both Parties have been residents of Pennsylvania for many years since then, making Pennsylvania law the appropriate vehicle for adjudication of a divorce and allocation of marital property.See, Sinha v. Sinha, 334 A.2d 600 (Pa. Super. 2003) (Pennsylvania court properly exercised jurisdiction in case where India was the place of marriage, but where parties were both domiciled and employed in Pennsylvania).  3  Case 17-11252-TPA Doc 377 Filed 04/09/20 Entered 04/09/20 15:23:32 Desc Main  Document Page 3 of 43

Document 377