3    April 22, 2010)). When determining whether to enter a default judgment under Rule 55(b)(2), courts should consider the following factors:   1) possible prejudice to the plaintiff; 2) the merits of the claims; 3) the sufficiency of the complaint; 4) the amount of money at stake; 5) possible disputed material facts; 6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect; and 7) the preference for decisions on the merits.   Russell v. City of Farmington Hills, 34 F. App’x 196, 198 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). After review of the above factors, the court determines that granting the Motion is appropriate.    For ease of analysis, the court starts with the fourth and seventh factors. Plaintiff seeks a  declaration that the $54,265.88 debt owed by Defendant is not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6). This is a significant amount of money Defendant will be forced to repay if Plaintiff prevails. In addition, the Sixth Circuit “has indicated a ‘strong preference for trials on the merits.’” United States v. Bridwell's Grocery & Video, 195 F.3d 819, 820 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Shepard Claims Serv., Inc. v. William Darrah & Assoc., 796 F.2d 190, 193 (6th Cir. 1986)). Thus, the fourth and seventh factors weigh against granting the Motion.    The remaining factors, however, all weigh in favor of granting the Motion. First, if the  court denies the Motion, Plaintiff will likely be prejudiced. Defendant was convicted of arson in 2011, and Plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Defendant in 2012, but there is no guarantee that either the default judgment or the arson conviction will be given preclusive effect in this case. See, e.g., White v. Trilogy Health Servs., LLC (In re White), 599 B.R. 14, 19, 20 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2019) (declining to give state court civil judgment preclusive effect in dischargeability proceeding); Allstate Ins. v. Dziuk (In re Dziuk), 218 B.R. 485, 490 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1998) (holding that state court arson conviction was not entitled to preclusive effect in § 523(a)(6) proceeding). Thus, Plaintiff may be forced to incur substantial expenses relitigating the facts underlying its claim even though the incident occurred over ten years ago.    Second, Plaintiff’s claim is meritorious. Section 523(a)(6) provides that a chapter 7  debtor cannot discharge a debt “for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity[.]” § 523(a)(6). “A debtor willfully and maliciously injures a creditor if, acting without just cause or excuse, he knows or is substantially certain that his actions will cause injury.” Doe v. Boland (In re Boland), 946 F.3d 335, 338 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). In the Motion, Plaintiff attached copies of the State Court subrogation complaint, motion for default judgment, and default judgment entry. Plaintiff also attached copies of the criminal arson complaint and judgment entry. Arson is a classic example of a willful and malicious injury under § 523(a)(6). See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Edie (In re Edie), 314 B.R. 6, 18 (Bankr. D. Utah 2004) (holding that plaintiff insurer’s subrogation judgment obtained due to debtor’s arson was excepted from discharge under § 523(a)(6)); Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. v. Shaw (In re Shaw), 252 B.R. 211, 215 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2000) (holding that damages caused by debtor’s solicitation of arson resulted in a nondischargeable debt under § 523(a)(6)). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim is meritorious.   20-06020-rk Doc 17 FILED 10/19/20 ENTERED 10/19/20 15:48:29 Page 3 of 4

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